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Defendants-Respondents file this Petition for Rehearing
pursuant to Rule 35, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

Counsel

for Defendants-Respondents hereby certify that this petition is
presented in good faith and not for delay.

BACKGROUND
This is a legal malpractice case.

Plaintiff Garth Youd

(MYoudM or "Garth") retained Defendants to pursue an action
against Zions First National Bank ("Zions") to recover amounts
Youd claimed due him under two Certificates of Deposit, one for
$10,000 and one for $15,000 ("the CD's").

The money for the CD's

had been deposited by Youd's father, Wilford, and the CD's were
payable to "Wilford Youd or Garth Youd."
favor of Zions.
Defendants.

Judgment was entered in

Youd then instituted this action against

Defendants admitted negligence, limiting the issues

to causation and damages —
the plaintiff.

whether Defendants' negligence harmed

Defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming

Zions was statutorily protected by Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-112 from
liability on claims such as Youd's for improper payment on
multiple-party certificates of deposit, and accordingly
Defendants' negligence could not have caused any damage to
Plaintiff, since he would have lost under any circumstances.

The

court below granted Defendants' motion.
Plaintiff appealed, claiming that there was a material
issue of fact as to whether Zions had reissued the $10,000

certificate of deposit to Garth before receiving Wilford's
contrary instructions, that Youd was entitled to recover on the
$10,000 CD pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-116, that Wilford's
request did not comport with statutory requirements, and that a
bailment theory entitled Youd to a claim of conversion.
Defendants responded on appeal, arguing that the UCC did not
apply# that Wilford's request was proper as a matter of law, that
there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning the
reissuance of the $10,000 CD, and that even if a bailment had been
created, Zions could have incurred no liability to Youd for
following the instructions of the undisputed owner of the CD's,
Wilford.

In its opinion the Court held that the UCC did not

apply# and did not address the other issues, holding instead that
the CD's were ambiguous as to whether or not they created a joint
account between Garth and Wilford, which it stated was a
prerequisite to the application of Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-112 and
reversed for further proceedings.
REASONS FOR REHEARING
This Court reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Defendants because it concluded that
there was an ambiguity in the CD's which could preclude the
application of the shield from liability provided by Utah Code
Ann. § 75-6-112, which was the basis for the lower court's
ruling.

The Court should reconsider its opinion because:
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1.

There are no material issues of fact to preclude

summary judgment.

Regardless of the determination of the issue

raised by the Court of Wilford Youd's intent in depositing the
funds into the CD's, Defendants are still entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law.

If he had no intent to give Garth a

joint interest in the certificates, Garth had no claim to them and
therefore no cause of action against Zions for not paying him the
money.

If Wilford did intend to make Garth a joint payee, we

return to the issues argued and briefed on this appeal and Zions
is still protected by operation of § 75-6-112.

At most, the issue

raised by the Court should be treated as one admitted by the
Defendants for purposes of their summary judgment motion.

A major

purpose of summary judgment is to avoid an unnecessary trial,
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776 (Utah
1984).

The remand of this case would only result in a useless

trial concerning the intent of a dead man where either outcome
compels the same result obtained by the court below in granting
Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
2.

Even if the CD's are pay on death ("P.O.D.")

accounts, Zions would have still been entitled to protection from
§ 75-6-112, and summary judgment in favor of Defendants would
still be proper.
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3.

The Court's opinion could be read to find ambiguity

in virtually any document, effectively precluding summary judgment
in most cases.
4.

The Court's opinion could be read to expose financial

institutions to an untenable double-bind which the Legislature
addressed by passing § 75-6-112.
5.

Under no circumstances could Zions have been liable

for the reissuance of the $15,000 certificate, and at the least
the summary judgment should have been affirmed as to that
certificate.
ARGUMENT
I.

THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT TO PRECLUDE
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS.
The Court's opinion indicates that a determination of

Wilford Youd's intent at the time he deposited the funds into the
CD's must be made to see if § 75-6-112 applies.

Essentially the

question is whether the CD's were jointly payable to Wilford or
the Plaintiff or if they were payable only to Wilford during his
life and payable on his death to Plaintiff.

However, as the Court

points out, if it is a P.O.D. account:
. . . Garth did not have a joint interest in the
deposit account, (and) Zions would not have been
liable to Garth as a matter of law because he was
not a party to the account.
Opinion at 8.

Accordingly, the factual issue the Court discusses

is not a material issue of fact because if it is determined that
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Garth had no interest in the CD's, Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment, just as Zions would have been, and if he did
have an interest, § 75-6-112 precludes liability.
It is well-established that summary judgment is
appropriate:
. • . where it appears there is no genuine
dispute as to any material issue of fact, or
where, even according to the facts as contended
by the losing party, the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.
Machan Hampshire Properties v. Western Real Estate & Development
Co. , 779 P.2d 230, 114 U.A.R. 39, 40 (Utah App. 1989) (citations
omitted).

Here the Plaintiff did not argue the issue raised by

the Court, but even if it were assumed to be true, Defendants are
still entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the court below
should be affirmed.

As the Supreme Court of Utah has noted/

summary judgment is not precluded "whenever some fact remains in
dispute, but only when a materia} fact is genuinely controverted."
Helqar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980).
The Supreme Court has also stated that M[a] major purpose
of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trial . . . " Reagan
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah
1984).

Here a remand for a determination of Wilford's intent

would be a useless gesture, since even if Defendants lost that
issue and it was determined that Wilford intended to create a
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joint account, as the parties and the court below assumed, the
only issues remaining are those which were resolved by the
granting of Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and which
were at issue in this appeal.

In light of the lack of any

material issues of fact discussed by the Court concerning the
application of § 75-6-112 under the facts as they were assumed by
the parties and the court below (and as they would be if the
question of intent is resolved adversely to Defendants), remand
would be a waste of judicial resources, and the order of the court
below should be affirmed.
II.

EVEN IF THE CD'S ARE P.O.D. ACCOUNTS, SECTION 75-6-112
SHIELDS ZIONS FROM LIABILITY.
Defendants respectfully suggest that the Court was

mistaken in concluding that if the CD's were not joint accounts
then no discussion of section 75-6-112 could apply.

The

alternative to a joint account ra-ised by the Court is that the
CD's were P.O.D. accounts, payable to Plaintiff only after
Wilford's death.

It is clear that both joint accounts and P.O.D.

accounts are defined as "multiple-party accounts" under the terms
of the probate code.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-101(5).

Section

75-6-108 provides that H[a]ny multiple-party account may be paid,
on request of any one or more of the parties."

The term "party"

is defined to refer only to persons with a present right to
payment, § 75-6-101(7).

Section 75-6-112 provides in turn:
-6-

Payment made pursuant to section 75-6-108 . . .
discharges the financial institution from all
claims for amounts so paid whether or not the
payment is consistent with the beneficial
ownership of the account as between parties,
P.O.D. payees, or beneficiaries, or their
successors. . . .
Accordingly, regardless of Garth's right to any of the funds in
the CD's during his father's life, they were multiple-party
accounts, and Wilford's request that the CD's be reissued
constituted a request for payment under § 75-6-108•

Therefore,

Zions' action in honoring that request falls within the ambit of
§ 75-6-112 and Zions is shielded from liability under that
section, without respect to the other reasons Garth's claim may
also be rejected.
III. THE COURT'S DECISION MAY BE READ TO RENDER SUMMARY JUDGMENT
VIRTUALLY USELESS.
This opinion may be read to support arguments that
virtually any document is ambiguous so as to preclude summary
judgment, which could virtually eliminate summary judgment as a
useful tool to avoid needless trials and pare cases down to the
truly disputed issues.

While the Court correctly draws the

parties' attention to an ambiguity concerning who is entitled to
receive interest payments under the CD's, Defendants respectfully
request the Court to reconsider its decision where there is no
dispute between the parties as to the effect of the documents and
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no arguments raised that they are ambiguous.

To take that

ambiguity, coupled with the fact that the forms the CD's are on
have limited space for entering the address and social security
number of the payees and conclude that the CD's were ambiguous as
a matter of law so as to preclude summary judgment threatens the
efficacy of summary judgment motions in general.

This is

especially true in a case like this where, as discussed above, the
ambiguity has no legal impact on the outcome of the case.
It is also a dangerous precedent for the Court to look
behind the facts agreed to by the parties.

Summary judgment

motions permit the parties to obtain rulings as a matter of law
based upon a given set of facts.

For the court on appeal to

inquire into whether those facts are really true undermines the
purpose of summary judgment motions and results in a waste of
judicial resources at both the trial and appellate levels as well
as a waste of the parties' time and resources.
IV.

THE COURT'S OPINION MAY BE READ TO PUT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
IN A NO-WIN SITUATION WHERE THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED TO
PROVIDE PROTECTION.
Defendants submit, as discussed above, that § 75-6-112

provides protection to financial institutions paying on any
multiple-party account to a person with a present right of payment
without having to investigate the source of the funds or the
intention of the parties at the time of investment.
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However, if

the Court is correct that P.O.D. accounts are not subject to the
shield of § 75-6-112, then financial institutions are placed in an
untenable situation.
Using the facts of this case as an example, if Garth had
requested payment of one of the CD's, Zions would have had no safe
route under the current opinion.

If Zions could have divined that

the CD might be a P.O.D. account, despite the lack of any language
to expressly so indicate, it would have to refuse payment pending
a determination of Wilford's intent or risk paying to someone
without any present right to the funds, exposing it to liability
to Wilford.

But if Zions later determined that the CD was

intended to be a joint account, then it broke its contract with
Garth by not paying when requested, and could be liable to him for
damages due to the breach.
Section 75-6-112 attempts to free financial institutions
from having to investigate the relationship or agreement between
various payees prior to paying someone who is entitled to receive
payment.

This decision can be read to frustrate that purpose by

finding potential P.O.D. accounts despite the lack of any language
concerning payment on death, and holding that payment in such a
situation would not invoke § 75-6-112, despite its clear language
concerning application to multiple-party accounts, and its attempt
to free payors from investigation into the beneficial ownership of
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the funds.

Financial institutions should not be put into such a

position, especially where, as here, the undisputed beneficial
owner, Wilford, was paid the funds.
V.

IN ANY EVENT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO THE $15,000 CD SHOULD
BE AFFIRMED.
Even if the Court were to reject all of the above points,

there appears to be no reason to refuse to affirm summary judgment
as to the $15,000 CD.

Plaintiff did not even attempt to argue any

disputed facts concerning this CD.

It is clear that it was not

mature at the time Garth delivered it to Zions.

The only

arguments raised on appeal concerning this CD were that Wilford
did not make a proper request pursuant to § 75-6-108 or that a
bailment was created and breached.

While the Court's opinion does

not address either of these issues, as Defendants argued in their
brief on appeal, neither of Plaintiff's arguments have merit.
Wilford's request complied with all the conditions of the account,
according to Zions' policy and procedure, bringing it within the
definition of -request- set out in § 75-6-101(12).

Since Wilford

was the undisputed "owner- of the CD's, Zions' actions in
following his wishes rather than Garth's preclude imposition of
liability on Zions even if a bailment had been formed and
§ 75-6-112 did not expressly relieve it of liability for payment.
Since there is no basis for reversal on the $15,000 CD, at the
least the Court should affirm the summary judgment as to it.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants-Respondents request
the Court to grant its Petition for Rehearing.
DATED this

5

day of January, 1990.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Thomas L. K€y
Steven J Aeschbacher
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents
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